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RECENT CASES
COMPARATIVE RECTITUDE IN DIVORCE ACTIONS*
The doctrine of recrimination in divorce actions is an application of
the equitable maxim that one coming into equity must do so with clean
hands. In the event that there is no innocent party to pray relief, the
court in effect refuses its aid and allows the wrongful acts of the parties
to recriminate--or literally "accuse in return"-and counterbalance
each other.2 The doctrine of recrimination was well settled in divorce
actions in the United States at an early date, 3 although deviations from
the strict doctrine in order to achieve substantial justice have appeared
in the law from time to time almost from the beginning.4
Until very recently, it was generally thought that the doctrine of
* Stewart v. Stewart, 29 So. 2d 247 (Fla., 1947).
I Devlin v. Devlin, 24 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1946) (Recrimination not men-
tioned but divorce denied to an admittedly adulterous spouse on the
ground of unclean hands); accord, Adams v. Adams, 12 Ore. 176, 6 Pac.
677 (1885); Carmichael v. Carmichael, 106 Ore. 198, 211 Pac. 918 (1923);
Hall v. Hall, 69 W. Va. 175, 71 S. E. 103 (1911); Day v. Day, 71 Kan.
385, 80 Pac. 974 (1905).
2 Blankenship v. Blankenship, 51 Nev. 356, 276 Pac. 9 (1929), 63
A.L.R. 1127 (ann.); Hall v. Hall, supra Note 1; Morrison v. Morrison,
142 Mass. 361, 362, 8 N. E. 59, 60 (1886).
3 Mattox v..Mattox, 2 Ohio (2 Ham.) 233, 15 Am. Dec. 547 (1826);
Conant v. Conant, 10 Cal. 249, 70 Am. Dec. 717 (1858); Pierce v. Pierce,
33 Iowa 238 (1872); Cassidy v. Cassidy, 63 Cal. 352 (1883) (Under Civil
Code); Trigg v. Trigg (Sup. Texas), 18 S. W. 313 (1891). (This doctrine
is of ancient equitable origin; being recognized by the Mosaic Code, the
Roman law, the ecclesiastical courts, and finally finding its way into
the common law).
4 Inskeep v. Inskeep, 5 Iowa (5 Clarke) 204 (1857) (Where the court,
acting under the Iowa Code said, "So, there may be cases which arise
under the law, where the parties are mutually at fault, in which a divorce
might be decreed.") Trowbridge v. Carlin, 12 La. Ann. 882 (1857);
Thomas v. Tailleu, 13 La. Ann. 127 (1858), affirmed by Dillon v. Dillon,
32 La. Ann. 643 (1880); Machado v. Bonet, 39 La. An.n 475, 2 So. 49
(1887); Colvin v. Colvin, 15 Wash. 490, 46 Pac. 1029 (1896), see dissent;
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 36 Ore. 92, 58 Pac. 892 (1899); Day v. Day, supra,
Note 1; Abshire v. Hanks, 19 La. Ann. 425, 44 So. 186 (1907); Rolfsen v.
Rolfsen, 115 S. W. 213, 1201 (Ky., 1909); Garrett v. Garrett, 252 Ill. 318,
96 N. E. 882 (1911); Staples v. Staples, 136 S. W. 120 (Texas, 1911);
Weiss v. Weiss, 174 Mich. 431, 140 N. W. 587, (1913); Johnson v. Johnson,
78 Wash. 423, 139 Pac. 189, 1200 (1914); Schirmer v. Schirmer, 84
Wash. 1, 145 Pac. 981 (1915).
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recrimination in divorce actions was firmly established in Florida law.
It has been clearly stated several times by the Florida Supreme Court, s
and although in each instance the statement was actually dictum, the
doctrine of recrimination -was assumed to be settled law in this state.
The recent Stewart case6 has shown this assumption, made on the basis
of dicta alone, to be in error.
Recrimination on grounds of adultery has a statutory basis in Florida.
Since the Act of October 31, 1828, the Florida statutes have provided
that "If it shall appear to the court . . . that both parties have been guilty
of adultery, then no divorce shall be decreed." 7 This statute has had,
however, a singularly uneventful history. The Chisholm case9 in 1929
was apparently the first Florida Supreme Court case to refer to the
statute, and it merely held the statute inapplicable where the adultery
was committed through an honest belief of the guilty party that she had
been legally divorced and remarried. The Chisholm decision, however,
contained a passing statement which seems to have been the basis for
all the later dicta. The court said, "Other states hold to the more reason-
able and perhaps sounder doctrine that, when one party commits an
act affording grounds for divorce against the other, that the court will
not grant the prayer of such a one for divorce from the other." Three
years later, the Florida Supreme Court cited this case as authority for
the full-blown doctrine of recrimination.10 Speaking through Justice
Terrell, the court said, "The general rule is that to constitute a defense
by recrimination the misconduct that defendant charges complainant
with must be such that if proven will afford defendant a ground for
divorce." This statement, although not necessary to the decision of the
case, has been cited ever since as good Florida law.
The Stewart case was not completely unheralded. A tacit departure
from the doctrine of recrimination had already been made in the case of
Simmons v. Simmons" where a double divorce was allowed on the
grounds of the husband's extreme cruelty and the adultery of the wife.
The husband brought the action and proved his wife's adultery. His
wife in her answer asked for a divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty
which she likewise succeeded in proving. The double divorce granted
was the complete antithesis of the doctrine of recrimination. Neverthe-
5 MacFadden v. MacFadden, 26 So. 2d 502 (Fla., 1946); Sahler v.
Sahler, 154 Fna. 206, 17 So. 2d 105 (1944); McMillan v. McMillan, 120
Fla. 209, 162 So. 524 (1935); Welch v. Welch, 112 Fla. 590, 152 So.
173 (1933).
6 Stewart v. Stewart, 29 So. 2d 247 (Fla., 1946),
7 F.S.A. 1941, Sec. 65.04 (3) Second Clause.
s Of. Devlin v. Devlin, 24 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1946), wherein an adulter-
ous husband was refused a divorce on the general doctrine of unclean
hands with no mention of the statute.
9 Chisholm v. Chisholm, 105 Fla. 402, 142 So. 302 (1932).
10 McMillan v. McMillan, supra Note 5.
It 122 Fla. 325, 165 So. 45 (1936).
1947]
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
less, the Supreme Court in two succeeding cases restated the doctrine of
recrimination as if the Simmons case had never been decided. 12 With
Stewart v. Stewart1' the strict doctrine of recrimination was at last dis-
carded, and its application made a matter of judicial discretion.
In the Stewart case, the parties leveled at each other a bewildering
complex of charges of misconduct, misbehavior, desertion and general
abandonment of the marriage obligation. The Circuit Court dismissed
the wife's counterclaim for separate maintenance on the strength of the
master's finding that the equities were with the plaintiff husband. On
appeal from a decree for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court per curiam
stated: "We are of the opinion that this misconduct on his part (adultery
of the husband as charged in the answer) was established and that,
both parties being at fault, the case should have been dismissed." 14 On
rehearing, the order of reversal was set aside and the husband's decree
was affirmed.15
Associate Justice Fabisinski in his dissent in the Stewart case
recognizes that the Stewart case introduced the principle of "comparative
rectitude" into the divorce law of Florida. After reviewing the history
of the application of the doctrine of recrimination in other jurisdictions,
he said that, "our state has established the doctrine by statute. If it is to
be adopted in Florida, I think we should 'pass a law.' "16 The state-
ment goes too far. The only statutory recrimination in Florida is that
based on double adultery.
Comparative rectitude, as applied by the majority of the court in the
Stewart case, is based on the principle that under proper circumstances,
relief by way of divorce may be given to the party least at fault, though
both parties have shown a ground for divorce. There is in this country
a distinct trend towards thus relaxing the ancient doctrine of recrimna-
tion.' 7 The return to cohabitation which the canon law presumed to
take place when the court refused a separation, does not in fact take
12 MacFadden v. MacFadden and Sahler v. Sahler, supra Note 5.
13 29 So. 2d 247 (Fla., 1947).
14 Id. at 248.
1S The court said,... "Judging from the cold record it might
reasonably be said that each proved his or her charges . . ., and it
might reasonably be said that recrimination has been established by
each against the other . . . However, the master and Chancellor
found the equities with the plaintiff and it has not been made to
affirmatively appear that inequity has been done by the Chancellor by
his decree of divorce." The opinion makes no mention of F.S.A. 1941,
Sec. 65.04 (3) discussed above. If the husband were guilty of adultery
as the court found in its first opinion, there would seem to be no way
to avoid the clear terms of the statute. This point, however, is ignored
in the decision on rehearing.
16 29 So. 2d 247, at 249.
17 For two recent cases reviewing the trend see Pavletich v. Pavletich,
et al., 50 N. Mex. 224, 174 Pac. 2d 826 (1946); Reddington v. Reddington,
317 Mass. 760, 59 N. E. 2d 775 (1945).
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place today; thus leaving one of the historical foundations for the
doctrine an outmoded concept of the ecclesiastical courts.
In the Stewart case, speaking through Judge Barns, the court says,
"The application of the doctrine of recrimination like the doctrine of
clean hands is a matter of sound judicial discretion dependent on public
policy, public welfare and the exigencies of the case at bar." This is a
distinct step towards practical justice by an enlightened court. Since the
state is a third party to all contracts of marriage, 8 'divorces are granted
for reasons of policy and not as a punishment to one party or a favor
to the other. If reasons of public policy sanction a divorce where one
party alone is guilty of a matrimonial offense, a fortiori such divorce
should be sanctioned where both are guilty. The marriage relationship
is doubly broken and the obstacles to further cohabitation and preserva-
tion of the family unit are likewise doubled.
is Potter v. Potter, 101 Fla. 1199, 133 So. 94 (1931); Gallemore v.
Gallemore, 94 Fla. 516, 114 So. 371 (1927).
